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New Regionalism and Latin America: 
The Case of MERCOSUL* 
Leonardo Campos Filho 
The focus of this paper is the new attempt at regional integration undertaken by 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The pursuit of integration is examined 
in the light of recent developments both at a world level and in the rest of Latin 
America. The motivations behind the scheme are analysed and its achievements 
and shortcomings are evaluated. The first section describes the recent worldwide 
surge in regionalism. Section two summarises the main contributions from 
economic theory that provide the basis for the analysis in subsequent sections. 
Section three focuses on the motivations behind the new regionalism and its 
potential implications for the world economy. Section four turns to the nature of 
recent economic integration in Latin America and makes some comparisons with 
previous attempts. Section five evaluates the experience of MERCOSUL. 
Section six presents a quantitative analysis of recent trends in trade flows for 
MERCOSUL countries. In the final section, some tentative conclusions are 
drawn. 
The Recent Pursuit of Regionalism: A World Perspective 
Policy-makers and many economists will certainly remember the late 1980s and 
early 1990s as an era marked by the rebirth of regionalism. As Melo and 
Panagariya (1992) put it: 
Today regionalism is back with a vengeance. In its current incarnation, regionalism 
has engulfed all major players in the world economy. Division of the world into 
three trading blocs - never an issue in the first round - is being debated seriously. 
Confidence in the GATT process is on the decline, and enthusiasm toward the 
regional approach on the rise. Most notably, the United States - an ardent defender 
of the multilateral approach and the most formidable opponent of regionalism in the 
1960s - has become an active perpetrator of regionalism.1 
Table 1 presents a series of regional trade arrangements (RTAs) notified to 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) since 1947.2 However, before 
MERCOSUL is the Portuguese acronym for South American Common Market. Its Spanish 
acronym is MERCOSUR. 
1 Melo and Panagariya (1992), p. 2. 
2 The author distinguishes RTAs from preferential schemes and association agreements. 
Preferential schemes account for non-reciprocal tariff reductions agreed between developed and 
developing countries - e.g. the Lome Convention, whereby the European Union (EU) offers 
preferential treatment for imports coming from some African, Asian and Pacific countries. 
Association agreements are, in most cases, reciprocal agreements signed by an RTA and a specific 
country, extending free trade area treatment to a particular range of goods and services. For 
example, in 1992, an association agreement linked Turkey to the EFTA countries. See GATT 
(1995). 
proceeding with the analysis, I shall comment on the relationship between 
GATT and regional trade arrangements. 
GATT was established in 1947 with the objective of promoting multilateral 
negotiations towards dismantling protectionist measures. GATT negotiations 
rest on the concept of non-discrimination embodied in the most-favoured-nation 
clause, which guarantees that all contracting parties receive from each member 
treatment similar to that offered to the most favoured partner. In contrast, RTAs 
entail discriminatory preferences for imports coming from distinct countries, and 
thus they are obliged to comply with Article XXIV of GATT, which deals with 
customs unions and free trade areas.3 A free trade area implies the elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers among members, who retain their individual trade 
policies regarding non-member countries and apply rules of origin for regional 
imports.4 Customs unions entail not only the abolition of obstacles to trade 
among participants, but also the adoption of a common external tariff (CET) for 
trade with non-members.5 To be consistent with Article XXIV, regional trade 
arrangements should comply with two major principles. Firstly, 'substantially 
all' trade among participants of either a free trade area or customs union should 
be liberalised. Secondly, within a customs union, the CET should not be higher 
than the average tariff levied by member countries prior to the union. The first 
principle was envisaged to allow exceptions to the most-favoured-nation clause 
only when the RTAs aimed to reduce almost all mutual tariffs to zero. The 
second would ensure that the move towards an RTA was not intended to raise 
the levels of protection against the rest of the world (ROW). Ambiguities in the 
interpretation of legislation and the lack of enforcement powers have greatly 
weakened the application of GATT rules.6 In fact, the record of the past fifty 
years suggests that GATT's evaluations of regional arrangements were, to a 
large extent, ineffective. As Lloyd (1992) pointed out: 
Of the more than 70 arrangements under Article XXIV which have been reviewed 
by the GATT, only four were declared fully compatible with the Article.... 
However, no agreement was declared incompatible with the Article.7 
After 1979, GATT exempted regional trade agreements created by developing countries from 
meeting the Article XXIV criteria. 
4 Rules of origin state the requirements that must be met for regional imports to be given duty-
free treatment. They are devised to deter extra-regional imports entering a high tariff member 
through a low tariff country. 
5 Apart from free trade and customs unions, RTAs may evolve to common markets and economic 
and monetary unions. In a common market, one has all the elements of a customs union plus free 
labour and capital mobility. An economic union is a common market with a common currency and 
common macroeconomic policies. 
6 See Bhagwati (1993a). 
7 Lloyd (1992), p. 27. 
Table 1 - Regional Trade Arrangements Notified to GATT, 1947-92 
Title Members Year signed 
France-Italy Interim Customs 
Union (incorporated into the EC 
in 1957) 
France, Italy 1947 
South African-Southern 
Rhodesian Customs Union 
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia 1948 
Nicaragua and El Salvador Free 
Trade Area (incorporated into the 
Central American Free Trade 
Area in 1958) 
El Salvador, Nicaragua 1951 
European Coal and Steel 
Community (incorporated into 
the EC in 1957) 
Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, West 
Germany 
1951 
European Economic Community 
(including European Atomic 
Energy Community) 
1. Original Members: Belgium, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, West Germany 
2. Denmark, Ireland, United 
Kingdom joined in 1973 
3. Greece joined in 1983 
4. Portugal and Spain joined in 
1986 
1957 
Central American Free Trade 
Area (incorporated into the 
Central American Common 
Market in 1960) 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
1958 
European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) 
1. Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom 
2. Denmark and United 
Kingdom seceded and joined 
the EC in 1973 
3. Iceland acceded in 1970 
4. Finland became a full member 
in 1970 
5. Portugal seceded and joined 
the EC in 1986 
1960 
Latin American Free Trade Area 
(replaced by the Latin America 
Integration Association in 1980) 
1. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay 
2. Colombia and Ecuador 
acceded in 1961 
1960 
Central American Common 
Market 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
1960 
Arab Common Market United Arab Republic 1964 
Central African Economic and 
Customs Union 
Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon 
1964 
Canada-US Automotive 
Agreement (incorporated into 
Canada-United States Free Trade 
Area in 1988) 
Canada, United States 1965 
Table 1 Continued 
Title Members Date signed 
Australia-New Zealand Free 
Trade Agreement (replaced by 
the Australia-New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations 
Agreement in 1993) 
Australia, New Zealand 1965 
United Kingdom-Ireland Free 
Trade Agreement (incorporated 
into the EC in 1973) 
Ireland, United Kingdom 1965 
Caribbean Free Trade Agreement 
(replaced by the Caribbean 
Community and Common 
Market in 1974) 
Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1968 
Andean Pact 1. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru 
2. Venezuela joined in 1973 
3. Chile seceded in 1976 
1969 
Caribbean Community and 
Common Market 
1. Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad 
and Tobago 
2. Other countries joined in 1974 
1973 
ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Arrangements 
1. Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand 
2. Brunei joined in 1988 
1977 
Latin American Integration 
Association 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
1979 
Australia-New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement 
Australia, New Zealand 1983 
Free Trade Agreement between 
Israel and the United States 
Israel and the United States 1985 
Single European Act (replaced 
the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the European 
Economic Community and the 
European Atomic Energy 
Community) 
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, 
West Germany 
1986 
Canada-United States Free Trade 
Area 
Canada, United States 1988 
Note: These arrangements were notified under Article XXIV or in a few cases Article I or other 
articles. The table does not include preference schemes and association agreements notified to 
GATT 
Source: GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Supplements 1-36. GATT Activities, 
various issues, extracted from Lloyd (1992). 
Table 1 surveys the main RTAs established since the creation of GATT.8 
Four distinct phases can be distinguished over the fifty-year period. Firstly, 
between 1947 and 1957, the relatively few RTAs created were among bordering 
8 The list does not incorporate some of the RTAs between developing countries, which, after 
1979, did not need GATT notification and those among non-GATT members. For a recent appraisal 
of RTAs, see WTO (1996). 
countries, and, in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community, covered 
specific sectors. The second period started with the establishment of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958. Following the creation of the 
EEC, a wave of integration schemes spread throughout other parts of the 
European continent, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Notably, three 
regional schemes were created in Latin America; by 1969, almost all countries in 
the region were members of one of these schemes. In Africa an RTA was created 
between Central African countries, and in Europe the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA) was established. By the early 1970s, this process of regionalism had 
slowed down. From 1970 to the early 1980s, only one new RTA was notified to 
GATT. In Latin America, some RTAs changed their status; as was the case with 
the Latin America Free Trade Area (LAFTA) which was replaced by the Latin 
America Integration Association (LAIA). Moreover, there was an increase in the 
number of participants within the Caribbean Community. In Europe, the EEC 
continued its dynamic growth with the accession of the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark in 1973, and of Greece in 1981. Finally, the first RTA (ASEAN) was 
established in Asia. 
The fourth phase of regionalism began in the mid-1980s, bringing a new 
wave of RTAs. In Europe, there was a continual widening of the original EEC. 
Portugal and Spain acceded in 1986. In 1995, Austria, Sweden, and Finland 
joined the EU.9 In 1991, EFTA countries signed an agreement with the EC, 
effectively linking the two arrangements.10 In North America, the impulse 
tpwards regionalism reached new heights. Following the creation of a free trade 
agreement with Israel, the United States established a fully-fledged free trade 
agreement with Canada in 1989. More recently, in 1994, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was set up between the United States, Canada 
and Mexico. 
Renewed efforts towards regional integration were also initiated in Latin 
America. In 1989, the Andean Pact was revived with the signature of the Quito 
Protocol.11 In 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay set up the South 
American Common Market (MERCOSUL). The Central American Common 
Market (CACM) also received a new boost. The return of peace and a more 
stable political environment in Central America sparked off several initiatives, 
bringing the quest for regional integration back to the fore.12 Moreover, an 
impressive network of bilateral free trade agreements, linking a number of 
countries and regional schemes, has also been established throughout the 
region.13 In addition, agreements that would encompass the entire hemisphere 
The term European Community (EC) referred to the European Atomic Energy Community, 
European Economic Community and the European Coal and Steel Community. After 1992, the EC 
was renamed the European Union (EU). For a recent account of regional schemes, see Lawrence 
(1996) and WTO (1996). 
10 The agreement between EFTA countries and the EC has created an extensive free trade area 
that includes free circulation of goods, services, labour and capital. See Lawrence (1996). 
11 See Garay (1992). 
12 See Nogues and Quintanilla (1993), Lizano (1992) and Bulmer-Thomas (1992). 
13 Between 1990 and 1996, Chile signed free trade agreements with Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador and MERCOSUL. Mexico signed agreements with Chile, CARICOM, Costa 
have been discussed. In 1990, the Enterprise for Americas Initiative, launched 
by the US administration, provided the framework for negotiating free trade 
agreements across the entire American continent. During the 1994 Americas 
Summit held in Miami, the thirty-four participating countries agreed to 
commence talks on a free trade area for the Americas. In Asia, ASEAN has been 
revived, with members agreeing to the formation of a free trade area by 2007. 
Several countries of the Pacific Rim have recently launched the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum with a view to extending cooperation 
and the promotion of trade and investment. 
It should be borne in mind that the proliferation of RTAs does, in many 
cases, overstate the extent to which tariffs and non-tariff barriers have been 
eliminated. In the 1960s, for example, the pursuit of regional integration by 
developing countries did not bring any significant reduction of trade barriers. 
The impact upon regional trade flows was only temporary and, on some 
occasions, barely discernible.14 Even in the case of integration among developed 
countries, for example the United States and Canada Automotive Agreement and 
the Australia and New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, 
trade liberalisation did not extend beyond specific sectors. The case of the EU is 
possibly the only undisputed case of a broad regional arrangement where 
barriers to trade were, to a large extent, eliminated and intra-regional trade, as a 
proportion of the total trade, experienced a significant increase.15 
A comparison between recent and past waves of regionalism reveals some 
new features. As Lloyd (1992) noted, today's regionalism has, in most cases, 
'deepened' the scope of integration.16 Apart from the dismantling of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, the participating countries have begun to consider the 
elimination of measures that, although not directly related to trade, hinder the 
free circulation of goods, services and factors of production. In this respect, the 
progressive widening of the original EEC has also been accompanied by the 
extension of liberalisation and harmonisation in many new areas.17 Following the 
abolition of tariffs and many non-tariff measures, the EU has proceeded to 
harmonise technical norms and standards or enforce mutual recognition of 
regulatory frameworks. Other 'non-border' obstacles such as restricted access 
for foreign firms to government procurement, market access limitation for 
foreign firms and individuals in many services and professions, discriminatory 
domestic taxes and quantitative barriers were also eliminated. It is worth noting 
that the discriminatory nature of such 'non-border' measures grows in 
Rica, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela. Argentina signed agreements with Chile, Bolivia, 
Venezuela and Ecuador. Bolivia signed agreements with Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Chile and 
Brazil. Finally, agreements between CACM and Mexico, CARICOM and Venezuela, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela have been also signed. See Fuentes (1994), Lawrence (1996) and Financial 
Times (several issues). 
14 See Langhammer (1992) and WTO (1996). 
15 See Melo and Panagariya (1992), WTO (1996) and Winters (1993) for a critical analysis of the 
EU. 
16 See also Lawrence (1996). 
17 Many of these issues were broached by the Single European Act in 1986, which proposed the 
establishment of the 'Single Market' by 1992. 
importance when trade-related obstacles are eliminated. Thus, it becomes 
essential to tackle these barriers to ensure the full benefits of competition.18 
This trend has also found a parallel in North America. The United States-
Canada sectoral agreement of 1965 evolved into a fully-fledged free trade area 
in 1989. This agreement embodied not only the pursuit of free trade in goods 
and a range of services, but also preferential treatment for investors from both 
countries and an effort to liberalise government procurements. The 
establishment of NAFTA in 1994 greatly emphasised the relative importance of 
such issues. Provisions for the liberalisation of cross-border investment within a 
wide range of services were introduced and provisions made for the further 
liberalisation of access to government procurement.19 In addition, NAFTA led to 
peripheral-agreements on environment and labour standards. The Australia-New 
Zealand Treaties were also considerably deepened. Not only was free trade in 
goods, services, labour and capital pursued and achieved in the late 1980s, but 
also the substantial liberalisation of non-border measures. A competitive 
regional policy and mutual preference in government procurement were also put 
into effect. Furthermore, an explicit commitment to the harmonisation of many 
standards was also stressed.20 In the case of developing countries, the new efforts 
towards integration have not substantially dealt with such 'non-border' issues.21 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the regional agreements are heading for 
more trade liberalisation. For example, in Latin America, generalised across-the-
board tariff reductions are now more often seen than the adoption of positive 
lists, where liberalisation occurs only in specified products. Another aspect of 
the new regionalism representing a break from the past was the widening of 
schemes, created by developed countries, to encompass low-income bordering 
partners. In Europe, the EC was expanded to include Portugal, Spain and 
Greece; in North America, Mexico acceded to NAFTA. 
Theory of International Integration: Some Considerations22 
Jacob Viner's 1950 contribution to this field is the cornerstone of economic 
analysis of the effects of regional arrangements on welfare. Viner (1950) 
identified two effects associated with the formation of a customs union. Firstly, 
there may be trade creation, where supply is shifted from high cost domestic 
producers towards a low cost source within the union. Secondly, there may be 
trade diversion, which entails the shift of supply from a low cost source outside 
the union towards a high cost producer established within the union. Trade 
creation enhances efficiency and welfare by orienting scarce resources according 
to each country's comparative advantage. In turn, trade diversion curbs 
However, as noted later in the text, the quest for the harmonisation of policies and standards 
does not necessarily guarantee that the outcome will be less restrictive and more efficient. For 
example, RTAs may also adopt complex common standards, so as to shelter domestic firms from 
extra-regional competition. 
19 NAFTA also strengthened a dispute settlement mechanism previously included in the Canada-
US agreement. See Lawrence (1996) and WTO (1996). 
20 See Lawrence (1996). 
21 See Fuentes (1994) for the case of Latin America. 
22 For a comprehensive survey on this issue, see Hine (1994). 
efficiency and welfare by diverting resources from their most efficient use. A 
customs union is said to be welfare-improving when trade creation exceeds trade 
diversion.23 Ruling out terms-of-trade effects, a net welfare-enhancing customs 
union leads to an improvement in world welfare. 
Post-Vinerian literature greatly relied on models based on two goods and 
three countries. Two countries are potential partners (home and foreign) and the 
third represents the rest of the world (ROW). Potential partners import different 
goods. The home country is taken to be small and thus faces an infinitely elastic 
supply of imports and demand for exports. Perfect competition prevails with the 
production of homogeneous goods under increasing marginal cost. Figure 1 
presents the partial equilibrium analysis following the formation of a customs 
union that entails the elimination of protection on the partner country's imports 
and maintenance of existing tariffs on ROW imports. When tariffs are levied on 
imports coming from all sources, the domestic price of imports (including the 
tariff) is /?3, which leads to a total demand of q3. Imports are represented by the 
distance q2q3, the difference between domestic production and demand. Tariff 
revenue can be measured from the areas e and g, which can calculated by 
multiplying imports by the difference between domestic and world prices. Given 
that the ROW is the most efficient source, domestic consumers will purchase all 
imports from ROW producers. Following the formation of a customs union, the 
tariff on partner imports is eliminated and the domestic price falls to p2. 
Domestic consumption rises to q4 and domestic production falls to ql, with 
imports increasing to q4ql. The partner country now supplies all imports 
purchased in the home country. 
Consumer surplus increases by the total area (c + e + d + f), where c is a 
transfer from producers and e tariff revenue forgone. Benefits from trade 
creation can be assessed by areas d and f , which are the net consumption and 
production gains from a rise in imports where the least efficient domestic source 
is displaced. It should also be noted that there is a shift of q2q3 in imports away 
from ROW (the most efficient source) towards the partner country. This 
amounts to trade diversion, and the associated loss in welfare can be assessed by 
area g, which is the additional cost incurred in the home country for acquiring 
q2q3. From the importing country's point of view, this area is also equal to the 
loss in customs revenue. Net welfare gains or losses occur, having taken into 
account the impact on consumer and producer surplus and tariff revenue. Given 
that the total loss in tariff revenue equals (g + e) and the fall in producer surplus 
is equal to c, the change in net welfare can be calculated as (d + f ) - g. Hence, 
there is no a priori hypothesis regarding gain or loss from integration; which 
means that welfare changes should be sensitive to the values of demand and 
supply elasticities, domestic tariffs and the difference between the partner and 
ROW prices. Thus, the study of the impact of regional schemes is often 
In Viner's original analysis, inter-commodity substitution was not allowed and this limited the 
consumer gains accrued from the formation of a custom union. When this paper refers to trade 
diversion and trade creation, following post-Vinerian literature, both production and consumption 
effects are considered. See Lipsey (1960). 
presented as an application of the theory of second best.24 This theory points out 
that if it is not possible to fulfil all the necessary conditions for the maximisation 
of welfare, a move towards the fulfilment of some conditions may make things 
better or worse. In the case of a customs union, given that worldwide free trade 
is ruled out, having free trade with a specific set of partners does not necessarily 
improve welfare. 
Figure 1 - Customs Union: Partial Equilibrium Analysis 
where: 
pi = world price 
p2 = regional partner price 
p3 = domestic price 
ql = domestic production after RTA 
q2 = domestic production before RTA 
Despite the absence of general hypotheses, there are some factors that may 
enhance the possibility of trade creation and/or narrow the scope for trade 
diversion. A customs union will be conducive to trade creation when members 
have a similar range of protected sectors which, in turn, present significant cost 
differences across the union. Trade diversion may be less widespread if actual 
trade flows account for a small proportion of production and a large percentage 
of existing trade is with a future partner.25 A customs union will also curb 
potential trade diversion when it incorporates many partners and the CET is set 
below the level prevailing prior to integration. 
24 See Lipsey and Lancaster (1956). 
25 See Hine (1994) and Lipsey (1960). 
When the assumption of a small open economy is dropped, a situation may 
be envisaged in which countries gain from enhanced terms of trade following the 
formation of a customs union.26 Where the forces of trade diversion are strong 
and members are large, the reduction in the demand for imports from the rest of 
world will lower prices. Assuming balanced trade, exports are diverted from the 
rest of the world in order to pay for increasing regional imports, and this should 
shift their prices upward. As a result, the union will benefit from improved terms 
of trade to the detriment of the rest of the world. Such gains from terms of trade 
can be extensive and offset the cost of trade diversion. They are, however, 
greatly curtailed by the potential losses associated with retaliation. Provided 
outside partners raise their barriers on exports from the union, these gains are 
likely to turn into losses for all countries. The terms of trade argument can also 
be presented within a context in which it does not necessarily imply a net loss 
for the ROW. Regional integration may entail the strengthening of bargaining 
power within international negotiations, and influence the imposition of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers upon its members. Here, the formation of RTAs would 
enhance their members' terms of trade by avoiding the negative effects derived 
from other countries' barriers to trade. The threat of joint retaliation from a 
group of partners would act as a deterrent to outsiders seeking to raise 
protection.27 An RTA may also enable member countries to strike better deals 
for bilateral tariff reductions than they ever could with each acting on their own 
account. Gains from enhanced bargaining power are likely to be proportional to 
the economic size of the regional arrangement vis-a-vis the ROW. Thus, not all 
attempts at integration will be successful in acquiring such benefits. 
Particularly important to our analysis is the literature evolving from Viner's 
work that has investigated the economic rationale that motivates countries to 
engage in regional schemes instead of supporting unilateral liberalisation.28 
Using the standard assumptions outlined above, one can show that non-
preferential trade liberalisation could secure the benefits of trade creation, 
without the harmful effects of trade diversion.29 Thus, unilateral (non-
preferential) trade liberalisation would generate more welfare gains than a 
customs union. The justification for integration, under these circumstances, 
would then relate to the achievement of non-economic objectives. This line of 
reasoning is nevertheless considerably weakened when the standard assumptions 
are modified. When one assumes that all parties have tariffs, transportation costs 
are not zero and a movement towards a customs union entails a fall in tariffs on 
See Mundel (1964) for the original formulation of the possibility for mutual benefits from 
improved terms of trade within a customs union. It is worth noting that the hypothesis that customs 
unions enhance their members' terms of trade vis-a-vis the outside world depends greatly on the 
assumptions of the model. One example is where the terms of trade of the ROW improve vis-a-vis 
the union. 
27 For example, there is evidence that the threat of retaliation from the EC has restrained the 
United States from applying anti-dumping measures and countervailing taxes upon its members. It 
has not, however, prevented the United States from imposing such measures on individual countries 
such as Japan, India and Brazil. See Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik (1993). 
28 Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik (1993) offer a recent survey on the issue. 
29 See Cooper and Massell (1965). 
exports from the home country, a customs union may provide additional benefits 
not matched by unilateral liberalisation.30 The key issue here is that the existence 
of transportation costs and tariffs in the ROW reduces the terms of trade it could 
offer to union members.31 Hence, this opens up the possibility that a customs 
union will offer terms of trade unattainable in unilateral trade liberalisation. 
Naturally, this outcome will be more likely in a world where tariff barriers are 
high and most economies are relatively closed to trade.32 
The standard theoretical framework and most of the quantitative studies 
referring to international integration focus on the potential gains from 
specialisation based on static comparative advantage. Other sources of potential 
gains have, however, been given increasing attention. Since the late 1970s, a 
growing number of studies have attempted to shed light on the benefits of 
economies of scale, product differentiation and increasing competition in 
product markets.33 Enlarging markets may now lead to gains from the process of 
industry rationalisation,34 reduction of monopolistic rents, increased product 
variety and the promotion of technical efficiency. Developments in growth 
theory have recently provided evidence of the dynamic positive effects of trade 
openness. The new body of theory emphasises the endogenous nature of 
technological progress and positive effects of trade openness on the 
incorporation of new technology embodied in goods and services. In this 
context, regional integration may buttress growth rates by fostering trade in new 
capital goods and by allowing the cost of research and development to be spread 
oyer many countries.35 Lastly, the recent trend towards the dismantling of 'non-
border' measures and the harmonisation of policies and standards has raised 
several pertinent questions relating to the impact of integration. Here, the 
application of the traditional theoretical framework has visible limitations. As 
Lawrence argued, while the traditional framework focuses mainly on changes in 
prices, these issues call for specific tools to gauge the impact of changing rules 
and institutions.36 
30 See Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981). 
31 Tariffs and transportation costs in the ROW will reduce the price of exports in relation to 
imports. 
32 See Hine (1994) and Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik (1993). 
33 The relationship between economic integration and economies of scale has been identified in 
many previous works, including Viner (1950). Corden (1972) made a detailed examination of the 
effects manifested when economies of scale, internal to the firm, are introduced. The author 
distinguished two new effects arising from the formation of a customs union. Trade suppression 
occurs when, after the formation of the customs union, domestic firms now produce a commodity 
that was previously imported. Cost reduction means the decline in average cost due to increasing 
scale. In general, the former, like trade diversion, reduces welfare and the latter improves it. 
34 Here, industry rationalisation refers to the fall in the industry-wide average cost. Given the 
presence of economies of scale, this can occur due to rising output across all firms or shifting 
market shares toward larger and more efficient firms. See Roberts and Tybout (1991) for a 
comprehensive analysis. 
35 See Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik (1993), Baldwin and Venables (1995), and Hine (1994) for 
an analysis of dynamic effects. 
36 See Lawrence (1996). 
New Regionalism: Motivations and Controversies 
By the early 1990s, the disillusionment concerning multilateral trade 
liberalisation under the auspices of GATT was the main reason underlying the 
new burst of regionalism. Despite the achievements of post-war years, during 
which time the successive GATT negotiations managed to cut considerably 
tariffs on manufactured goods,37 the multilateral approach began to run out of 
steam. In particular, the so-called new protectionism of the mid-1970s and early 
1980s emerged as a clear threat to the previous achievements of GATT. The 
nature and extent of this new protectionist movement was well summarised by 
Salvatore (1993): 
The instruments by which imports are restricted are also somewhat different from, 
and less transparent than, traditional import tariffs, and are called non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs). These refer to Voluntary' export restraints, orderly marketing 
arrangements, anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties, safeguard codes and 
so on. Thus, at the time when tariffs were being reduced as part of the successive 
rounds of trade liberalisation sponsored by the GATT and they are presently very 
low on most industrial goods, the number and importance of NTBs have grown 
rapidly since the mid-1970s and they have now become more important than 
tariffs as obstructions to international trade. As much as 50 per cent of world trade 
is now affected by this new protectionism.38 
The resurgence of protectionism within the developed world was, in part, a 
result of severe recession, under which unemployment in the United States and 
Western Europe soared in the early 1980s.39 The usual troublesome domestic 
adjustments, associated with rising imports, were made even harsher by sluggish 
growth rates and mounting idle capacity. In this respect, barriers to trade were 
frequently adopted to curtail growing imports from Newly Industrialising 
Countries (NICs).40 As discussed below, the latter group of countries includes 
many East Asian countries, which have been particularly successful in exporting 
labour-intensive manufactured goods. 
The dissemination of NTBs was already a concern when the Tokyo Round of 
GATT negotiations took place in Japan between 1974 and 1977. Nevertheless, 
no effective set of norms was agreed upon to deal with th^ir spread.41 There are 
major difficulties concerning the control of these restrictive practices by GATT. 
In many circumstances, NTBs are applied to protect domestic firms from 
predatory foreign competition. Dumping from foreign firms and/or export 
subsidies are often said to raise foreign competitiveness in domestic markets and 
harm national competitors. The problem, however, lies in the fact that GATT 
37 See Kenen (1994). 
38 Salvatore (1993), p. 1. 
39 As Corden (1993) noted, recession may bring rising trade barriers, but prosperity does not 
necessarily reduce such barriers to their initial levels. Strong domestic lobbying may ensure that, 
once established, such obstacles will be sustained although the initial cause may long since have 
passed. 
40 See Helleiner (1993). 
41 Nevertheless, new codes of conduct for import valuation issues and government procurement 
were, though with many exceptions, agreed upon during the Tokyo Round, see Kenen (1994). 
rules did not precisely define predatory behaviour, meaning that standard 
business practices may have been taken to be 'unfair\ On the other hand, some 
NTBs, such as subsidies and tax benefits for key industries, are considered by 
governments to be part of their spectrum of domestic policy tools. Consequently, 
they do not see a role for international agreements and GATT involvement.42 
A new round of GATT negotiations was convened in 1985 to stop the rise of 
protectionist pressures. The Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations began in 
1986, with many controversial issues on the negotiation agenda. On the one 
hand, large exporters of temperate-zone agricultural commodities were pushing 
for the opening up of Japanese and European markets. In this context, a bitter 
impasse emerged between the United States and the European Community over 
the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).43 On the other hand, 
developing countries, especially the NICs, wanted to see a cut in non-tariff 
barriers which were particularly harmful to their manufacturing exports. The 
United States and other developed countries expected to obtain a worldwide 
agreement on intellectual property and more open trade in services.44 After seven 
years of negotiations, the Uruguay Round came to an end in December 1993, 
and agreements were successfully reached on a wide range of topics. Some of 
the most troublesome issues were tackled, such as trade in agriculture and 
textiles. Furthermore, GATT was replaced by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), with greater autonomy to settle disputes among contracting members.45 
Nevertheless, the long and uncertain implementation periods of many provisions 
have given some grounds for caution. In agriculture, for example, the agreement 
stipulated a phase-out period of six years for the reduction (not elimination) of 
subsidies. In the case of textiles, non-tariff barriers will be lifted only at the end 
of 2003. Likewise, a period of ten years was given for the implementation of the 
agreement on intellectual property. The general agreement on services omitted 
key activities, such as financial and telecommunication services.46 New rounds 
of negotiations were scheduled for dealing with these sectors. Regulations for 
trade-related investment measures were agreed, but their scope was still limited. 
The lack of precision and enforcement of GATT rules on regional arrangements 
has not been remedied and an overhaul of such rules is not on the current agenda 
of the WTO.47 
By the early 1990s, the outlook of a world trade system threatened by 
growing protectionism and uncertainty regarding multilateral negotiations led 
some to see regionalism as an alternative track for trade liberalisation. The 
42 See Salvatore (1993). 
43 The latter provides not only protection for agricultural sectors in Europe, but also export 
subsidies that enable producers to get rid of unwanted surplus. 
44 See Kenen (1994), Evans and Walsh (1996), and Ethier (1995). 
45 See WTO (1996). 
46 In February 1997, a framework agreement, under the auspices of the WTO, was reached on the 
opening of domestic and international telecommunication markets to competition and foreign 
investment. Already, in 1998, progress towards liberalisation will be made in major portions of the 
world market, including the United States, EU and Japan. By 2005, these measures will be taken by 
another group of countries. Discussions for an agreement opening domestic markets in banking, 
insurance and other financial services are also well underway, see Economist (several issues). 
47 See Evans and Walsh (1996) for comprehensive coverage of the agreements. 
change in attitudes regarding the relative benefits of regionalism vis-a-vis 
multilateralism has been a remarkable feature of recent United States trade 
policy. Having been a strong supporter of the GATT multilateral approach, the 
United States turned to regionalism as a new way of accomplishing freer 
international trade. The reasons behind such a turnaround have been associated 
with an overall change in US perception regarding its position within the 
international arena. Bhagwati (1993b) argues that the recent loss of economic 
supremacy in the face of competition from Western Europe and East Asia led to 
an assumption in the United States that foreign firms benefit from 'unfair' 
advantages, sponsored by governments abroad. In their home markets, other 
countries would have the help of restrictive business practices to shelter them 
from import competition. And when selling abroad, they would benefit from 
subsidies and tax breaks. This perception led to a strong outcry for the United 
States to use protectionism to open foreign markets and curb 'unfair' practices. 
The move towards regionalism could then be understood as an element of this 
new approach to trade liberalisation. By acquiring closer reciprocal links with 
specific groups of partners, the United States could, in principle, guarantee 
'level playing-fields' both at home and within foreign markets. 
The surge of regionalism may also rest on a self-sustaining circle. Baldwin 
(1993) proposed an explanation for the spread of regionalism that rested on what 
the author called the 'domino' effect. Either the deepening or formation of a 
regional scheme, possibly for political reasons, would spark fears among 
exporters, from non-participant countries, of growing discrimination and falling 
sales and profits. Threatened by potential losses, exporters start lobbying for 
their country's accession. Ruling out resistance to new entrants within the 
existing bloc, the process of accession would depend on the relative power of 
domestic groups supporting or opposing integration. Thus, a picture can be 
envisaged in which renewed pressure from exporters will tilt the balance of 
incentives inside a country, leading to its accession. The increasing size of the 
bloc, moreover, leads to similar behaviour in other countries, where the balance 
of forces may not have previously backed accession. In sum, the continual 
widening of the integrated market will make the cost of being outside greater, tilt 
the balance of forces towards integration, and prompt more countries to accede. 
The proliferation of RTAs sparked a heated debate over the consequences of 
such schemes for the achievement of free trade worldwide. The core of the 
controversy can be summarised in the following question: Does new regionalism 
hinder or enhance the scope for future trade liberalisation worldwide? The case 
in favour of regionalism can be put as follows:48 given the problems facing the 
GATT negotiations for the effective liberalisation of such sectors as non-tariff 
barriers, foreign investment, and trade in services and agriculture, regional trade 
arrangements may be a smoother track to liberalisation. Multilateral negotiations 
were said to be a fertile ground for 'free riding', meaning that some countries 
benefit from non-discriminatory tariff reduction but refrain from offering similar 
concessions.49 The reduced number of countries and interests involved in 
48 See Dornbusch (1993) and Lawrence (1996). 
49 Due to their differential treatment under several GATT rules, developing countries were often 
regional negotiations would make coordination and enforcement easier, which 
would narrow the scope for free riding and facilitate a compromise. RTAs may 
also provide a 'learning' stage, in which nations experience the benefits of 
eliminating long-standing trade obstacles. This could indeed buttress the efforts 
to extend trade negotiations and concessions to a wider circle of countries. For 
example, a trade-creating RTA may increase the size of the export sector and 
reduce the size of the import-competing sector, thus reinforcing the political 
support for trade liberalisation. Therefore, the surge of regional integration may 
well lead to a 'higher plateau' of worldwide negotiations. Dornbusch 
summarised the argument as follows: 
In this optimistic perspective ten years of successful regional liberalisation may 
well be the prelude to a major round of world trade liberalisation of the kind that 
today seems difficult to reach.50 
As with most controversial issues in economics, there is also a strong case 
against regionalism. Helleiner (1993) argued that by bypassing the non-
discriminatory nature of GATT, regionalism posed a threat to the world trading 
system. A world divided by trading blocs, each with different a set of rules and 
principles, would mean a return to the 1930s and to its pitfalls: mounting 
protectionism, and growing political and economic rivalry. The point here is that 
the possibility for enjoying terms of trade gains, while imposing obstacles to 
trade with non-members, may be too tempting to be resisted. Thus, the formation 
of trading blocs may denote a surge of trade barriers and retaliation, with serious 
consequences for world welfare. Moreover, others attested that there was no 
guarantee that RTAs would evolve towards a multilateral framework. Regional 
arrangements may even hinder multilateral negotiations. Negotiations at a 
regional level may divert political and diplomatic resources from multilateral 
talks. Kenen (1994) recalled that this was the case when, during the 1980s, the 
EU perceived the Uruguay Round as a 'troublesome distraction' from the effort 
to complete the Single European Market. Bhagwati (1993a) stressed that, after 
securing large regional markets, governments' interest in multilateral talks may 
be weakened. Moreover, private interests trying to avoid growing competition 
may hinder further expansion of regional arrangements. He also stressed that 
regionalism need not be either faster or more efficient than multilateralism. For 
example, it was noted that the achievements of the EU have been carved out of 
decades of negotiations.51 Regarding the efficiency of new regional schemes, 
Bhagwati pointed out that small economies might accept less than optimal terms 
when bargaining their entry into regional schemes dominated by a large member. 
By the mid-1990s, it seemed the debate regarding the role of regionalism in 
the world trading system had become less controversial. On the one hand, 
empirical evidence has not given support to the view of a world trade system 
charged with free riding in former GATT negotiations; see Krueger (1995). 
50 Dornbusch (1993), p. 193. 
51 In this respect, it will be interesting to compare the process of implementation of both WTO 
and NAFTA provisions in the coming years. 
increasingly dominated by trading blocs.52 On the other hand, the multitude of 
recent preferential agreements among GATT members did not block a 
successful outcome from the Uruguay Round.53 Indeed, in a recent WTO report, 
regional schemes were portrayed as having a complementary role in fostering 
trade liberalisation.54 In this respect, the call for 'open regionalism' has been 
intensified. Nogues and Quintanilla (1993), for example, outlined six broad 
characteristics that such an outward-looking regional arrangement should attain. 
Firstly, liberalisation of intra-regional trade should be overwhelming; tariff and 
non-tariff barriers should be dismantled and a strict limit should be imposed on 
interim exceptions. Secondly, trade with outside partners should also be 
liberalised. In the case of customs unions, CETs should be lower than the 
average tariffs before the union. For free trade areas, rule of origin should not 
aim at providing further protection against sources outside the arrangement by 
being too restrictive. Next, regional schemes should have a universal inclusion 
clause allowing any country to accede. Fourth, the agreements should include a 
clause that hinders the adoption of anti-dumping and countervailing measures. 
Fifth, member countries of a free trade area should be open to unilateral 
liberalisation attempts, or continuing regional unilateral liberalisation should be 
pursued in case the existing common external tariffs are relatively high. Finally, 
regional trade arrangements should show a commitment to multilateral trading 
negotiations. 
The New Regionalism and Latin America 
As emphasised above, the new surge of regionalism has encompassed new 
schemes not only between developing countries, but between these and 
developed countries. It has also been noted that many new arrangements and 
attempts to revitalise old schemes have taken place in Latin America. In this 
section, I will turn to motives and the challenges facing the new surge of 
integration in the region. As noted in the introduction to this paper, the adoption 
of a more outward-oriented development strategy revealed a significant process 
of unilateral trade liberalisation in Latin America, and it is in this context that 
the resumption of regional integration can be viewed. Given that protection has 
been unilaterally reduced, the new surge of regional integration may be 
somewhat perplexing. Low trade barriers mean that the (static) gains associated 
with liberalisation have to a large part already been attained and the 'carrot' for 
regional schemes is long gone. The proliferation of regional agreements 
conceals, however, peculiar motivations that need close investigation. 
The 1960s' impetus towards integration was directly linked to the import-
substituting industrialisation (ISI) model. As mentioned earlier, the cost of ISI 
52 See Srinivisan, Whalley and Wooton (1993). 
53 As Peter D. Sutherland, GATT director-general in 1994, stated: ' as of the beginning of 1994, 
almost all of GATT's (then) 115 contracting parties were members of at least one preferential trade 
agreement, with the preferred vehicle being free trade areas - they outnumber customs unions five-
to-one'. Sutherland (1994), p. 2. 
54 This is not to say that the debate has been settled, since there are doubts if RTAs would, in 
practice, comply with commitments to further liberalisation. See WTO (1996) for an evaluation of 
the complementary role of regionalism and Bhagwati (1997) for a critique. 
began to increase rapidly when countries started to promote manufacturing 
industries where economies of scale prevailed and the cost of operating sub-
optimal plants was great. In many cases, constrained by their relatively small 
market, individual countries were not able to provide an optimum scale of 
production to reap the benefits of lower average cost. Therefore, regional 
integration was conceived as a way of rationalising ISI. A regionally integrated 
market would provide the basis for a more efficient industry and reduce the cost 
of stepping up the industrialisation process.55 
In the case of LAFTA, the scheme was initially composed of nine members: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay. Bolivia and Venezuela acceded in 1966 and 1967 respectively. In 
order to achieve regional trade liberalisation, national and common tariff 
concessions were established. The former referred to voluntary concessions and 
the latter referred to general reductions in tariffs to an agreed list of products. 
Within both schemes, tariffs were to be eliminated gradually on a product-by-
product basis. Furthermore, agreements for industrial complementation were 
proposed to boost trade in sectors with low inter-regional trade. Negotiations 
within LAFTA soon began to face serious problems. The initial rise in trade was 
concentrated in the most developed countries and tariff concessions were far 
from reaching more relevant proportions of regional trade. Most importantly, the 
attainment of further reductions in barriers to trade began to meet with great 
resistance from various quarters. The less developed countries demanded more 
preferential markets for their exports and a more active regional industrial 
policy. In turn, import-competing producers in more industrialised nations 
viewed the deepening of integration with caution, as it would introduce an 
unwelcome degree of competition within their domestic markets. Consequently, 
by 1969, there was a generalised postponement of most deadlines for 
liberalisation. In 1980, LAFTA was replaced by LAIA in an attempt to renew 
discussions on regional integration. In particular, LAIA incorporated a formal 
mechanism for bilateral trade agreements, which limited tariff concessions to 
countries involved in such agreements. 
As a reaction to the problems confronted in LAFTA, in 1969 the Andean 
Pact was formed between Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru 
(Venezuela joined in 1973). Apart from trade liberalisation, the aims of the 
scheme were largely associated with the establishment of a regional industrial 
policy, which could coordinate investment and trade in manufactured goods. 
Trade liberalisation was envisaged via an automatic reduction in tariffs and the 
introduction of a CET, which would be completed by 1980, in the case of Chile, 
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. Bolivia and Ecuador were given preferential 
treatment and had until 1990 to phase out their tariffs. Regional investment 
programmes were designed to foster industrialisation in regional markets, and a 
common code of treatment for foreign direct investment was also to be set out. 
The initial expansion in inter-regional trade was important, with the proportion 
of total exports going to regional markets increasing from 1.7 per cent in 1970 to 
55 See Nogues and Quintanilla (1993), and Edwards and Savastano (1989). 
4.5 per cent in 1979.56 Nevertheless, deep internal divisions emerged regarding 
the extent of trade liberalisation and scope of investment policies. Exceptions to 
tariff reductions proliferated and deadlines for the implementation of a CET 
were postponed. Furthermore, the investment programmes were not fulfilled, 
and disputes over a common treatment for foreign investment led to Chile's 
withdrawal in 1976. 
Judging by the extent of trade liberalisation and expansion of intra-regional 
trade, the CACM could be considered the most successful regional scheme in 
Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. The scheme was formed by Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in 1960. By 1966, 
tariffs were eliminated, a CET was achieved for 94 per cent of goods, and the 
proportion of total exports going to regional markets increased from 7.5 per cent 
in 1960 to 24.2 per cent in 1968.57 The dynamism of integration was 
nevertheless seriously marred by problems regarding the distribution of benefits 
among the member countries. In the 1980s, political turmoil and adverse 
external shocks led to the stagnation of the scheme.58 Lastly, one should mention 
efforts towards regional integration in the Caribbean, which started in the mid-
19608 when Antigua, Barbados and Guyana formed the Caribbean Free Trade 
Association (CARIFTA). By 1971, all Caribbean nations were associated to 
CARIFTA, which sponsored a fast reduction of trade barriers and an initial 
expansion of intra-regional trade. In 1973, the objectives of integration were 
intensified with the establishment of CARICOM, which aimed to adopt a CET, 
harmonise macroeconomic policies and create regional development agencies. 
The expansion of regional trade was, however, hindered by the intense 
reverberations from the oil shocks, sparking protectionist measures in many 
member countries. By the mid-1970s, the share of total exports going to regional 
markets returned to levels seen in the late 1960s. 
Reasons for the failure of regional integration usually revolved around two 
major factors.59 Firstly, the protectionist climate of that time meant countries 
might wish to expand their exports, but few would genuinely conceive of 
opening up their domestic markets. Secondly, given that those barriers to non-
member countries were usually kept high, regional schemes tended to entail 
potentially high trade diversion. Trade in manufacturing would be diverted from 
producers in the rest of the world towards the more advanced countries, which 
often had a relatively more sophisticated industrial sector. As a result, the 
schemes were marked by conflicts between the low and high-income countries 
over the distribution of costs and benefits. Either the lack of appropriate 
compensation instruments generated discontent among relatively poor members, 
or the complexity involved in their implementation led to other distortions -
innumerable tariff schedules and exceptions. 
56 See Edwards and Savastano (1989), p. 199. 
57 See Edwards and Savastano (1989), p. 196. 
58 See Cline (1982). 
59 See Melo and Panagariya (1992), Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik (1993) and Langhammer 
(1992). 
The motivations behind the recent surge of integration are markedly different 
to past experience. Two issues could be highlighted here. Firstly, regional 
integration is now seen as a vehicle in support of the 'new' economic model. By 
promoting regional trade liberalisation, Latin American countries aim to buttress 
the outward-looking development path.60 In this context, the principles of open 
regionalism - which embodies, among other elements, low barriers to non-
participants and more effective intra-regional trade liberalisation efforts - have 
been followed. In this respect, the countries are not only increasingly aiming to 
reap the standard benefits from freer regional trade, but are also securing gains 
from rationalisation of scale in manufacturing activities, fostering competition in 
oligopolistic sectors and encouraging direct foreign investment. 
Regional integration is also a reaction to the prospect of increasing world 
fragmentation and discrimination. The threat of a world divided into areas of 
influence, with high barriers towards non-participants, could greatly undermine 
the current outward-orientation. Securing unfettered access to a large market 
would thus be a prominent issue. However, given that regional markets are 
limited in size, countries should seek broader trade arrangements, and the 
prospect of a free trade agreement under US auspices is then the most probable 
outcome. As noted before, in 1990 the United States government launched the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EIA), which unveiled, among other 
things, a framework for future trade negotiations with Latin American 
countries.61 In this context, the objective of negotiating regional schemes in Latin 
America could be seen as a way of counterbalancing the strong negotiating 
position of the United States vis-a-vis its partners in the region. Here, two 
aspects are of particular relevance. The first relates to the prospect of a 'hub and 
spoke' pattern of trade and investment. By signing free trade area agreements 
with individual countries (spokes), the United States (hub) would obtain 
preferences in all markets. In turn, individual countries would obtain preferences 
only in the United States market. This would generate incentives for the 
diversion of investment towards the hub, where it would be possible to freely 
access all regional markets. This situation could be avoided by the establishment 
of RTAs among the spokes. The second aspect directly concerns the prospect of 
a hemispheric free trade agreement. By negotiating as a bloc the accession to a 
North American-based free trade zone, Latin American countries expect to 
minimise the asymmetry in bargaining power.62 In the words of Rosenthal 
(1992): 
Whether it be for a world with transparent trade or a fragmented world, Latin 
American countries will fare better if they are integrated, if for no other reason than 
diversifying the risks of joining the world, or forming part of a larger bloc, such as a 
free zone in the hemisphere.63 
60 See IRELA (1992), Fuentes (1994) and Bulmer-Thomas (1997) for an overview on the new 
surge towards regionalism in Latin America, its motivations and obstacles. 
61 See Whalley (1992). 
62 There are, however, serious doubts whether, given the difference in economic size between 
Latin America and the United States, meaningful gains from improving bargaining power are really 
feasible. 
63 Rosenthal (1992), p.80. 
The motivations behind the signing of NAFTA and the prospect of an 
integration arrangement between the United States, Canada and other Latin 
American countries merit closer investigation. Melo and Panagariya (1992) 
elucidated some of the elements underpinning the regional arrangements 
between developing and developed countries. They argued that, within a context 
in which developing countries are undergoing reforms aiming at more liberal 
trade and investment regimes, such schemes may provide what is known as a 
'lock in* effect. In essence, the binding commitments of the agreements would 
help to cement hard-fought policy changes. As previously noted, market access 
has been a major issue underlying such agreements. Bearing in mind the perils 
of the new protectionism, developing countries see such arrangements as a way 
of securing access to large markets for their exports. As one might envisage, the 
two aforementioned aspects interact. Since the potential 'penalties' - in terms of 
market access for example - for breaking the agreement are probably high, the 
chances of 'locking in' liberal policies, under the aegis of regional commitments, 
are reinforced. Developing countries can, moreover, 'borrow' from developed 
countries institutions that are conducive to growth and stability. The enlargement 
of the EC provides a good illustration of some of these elements in action. The 
entry of Portugal, Spain, and Greece into the European Community helped those 
countries to consolidate trade policy reforms. Moreover, it has been argued that 
the move in Europe towards economic and monetary union serves the objective 
of binding the members' macroeconomic policy to the anti-inflationary 
credentials of the German Bundesbank.64 
Nevertheless, many challenges lie ahead for regional arrangements between 
developed and developing countries. Langhammer (1992) highlighted the fact 
that the potentially high inter-industry trade and specialisation resulting from 
such RTAs would lead to high adjustment costs. Given that relative factor 
endowments differ significantly among developed and developing countries, the 
likely outcome will be the reallocation of factors of production between broad 
economic sectors. Such shifts in resource allocation may raise the cost of 
adjustment, as in the case of long periods of idle capacity and extensive 
retraining.65 There is also concern over the fact that developing countries may 
adhere to protectionist practices adopted by the developed member. For 
example, there is no guarantee that Mexico will not, as a result of NAFTA, 
begin to adopt protectionist measures (such as anti-dumping procedures and 
countervailing taxes) similar to those applied by the United States upon non-
member countries. Indeed, in attempting to 'alleviate' growing competitive 
pressure inside the region, countries may be stimulated to adopt anti-dumping 
measures against outsiders.66 Even if the non-tariff barrier is not adopted across 
64 See Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik (1993). 
65 When economies showing relatively similar factor endowments integrate, the most likely 
outcome is growing intra-industry trade and specialisation. The shifts in resource allocation are 
confined to narrowly defined sectors, and the cost of reallocation is bound to be lower than in the 
case of inter-industry changes. For example, adjustments within branches of manufacturing 
transport equipment may lead to the relocation of labour from the production of finished cars to 
truck parts. Such changes in the composition of output and the labour force are likely to require less 
retraining than, say, a shift from fishery production towards high-tech manufacturing. 
66 See Bhagwati (1993b). 
the free trade area, a complex set of rules of origin will be needed to ensure that 
the measure works. And this may interfere with the normal functioning of the 
free trade area. In the case of a customs union, all members should follow the 
rise in protection sponsored by one member. Here, given the CET, the union will 
collectively adopt the unilateral rise in trade barriers.67 In particular, a situation 
of potentially high trade diversion might be envisaged if developing countries 
establish a free trade area with developed countries but maintain high tariff and 
non-tariff barriers for non-member competitors. It is also worth recalling that the 
relatively low bargaining power of developing countries when negotiating with 
large countries might lead to non-optimal outcomes. Such concern is particularly 
relevant when issues related to deeper integration are at stake — for example, the 
harmonisation of intellectual property rights or environmental standards. The 
possibility that the bargaining process may lead developing countries to accept 
institutional frameworks that do not best suit their needs should be kept in 
mind.68 
The Case of MERCOSUL 
Major attempts to revitalise cooperation and integration between Argentina and 
Brazil date from the mid-1980s.69 A changing political context, marked by a 
return to democracy in both countries, had helped to lessen old rivalries and 
generated a fertile terrain for closer diplomatic relations. The creation of the 
Programme of Economic Integration and Cooperation (PICE) signed in 1986 
was an important step towards a regional scheme. The objectives of this 
programme were outlined in numerous statements and 24 protocols were signed 
between 1985 and 1990. To increase overall trade, negotiations were initiated 
for a gradual exchange of preferences on a product-by-product basis. A select 
number of sectoral agreements were envisaged, relating to such areas as 
transport, energy, steel products, aeronautics, vehicles and spare parts. The 
restructuring of manufacturing activity in both countries was a major underlying 
concern in these protocols. 
However, the core of the whole scheme was the protocol on capital goods. 
The PICE aimed to create a customs union within this sector. To this end, a list 
of capital goods with zero tariffs and non-tariff barriers was drawn up, and its 
progressive expansion to include a whole range of goods was also agreed. Two 
factors justified the special attention given to capital goods: firstly, the severe 
drop in investment resulting from the contraction of GDP after the debt crisis led 
to a sharp cut in demand for capital goods. Secondly, it was argued that the 
sector could provide substantial positive externalities through technological 
innovation. Given existing imbalances in the foreign accounts of both countries, 
the programme also highlighted the need for the maintenance of a dynamic 
equilibrium in bilateral trade flows. To this purpose, a compensation mechanism 
was introduced. This would speed up trade liberalisation within the country 
67 Winters (1993) gives the example of voluntary export restraints on Japanese video cassette 
recorders (VCRs), initiated by France and applied by the whole European Community. 
68 See Bhagwati (1993b) and Rodrik (1995). 
69 See Meirelles (1995), Lucangeli (1995) and Campos (1991). 
showing a surplus, and provide credit for financing ongoing deficits. Between 
1986 and 1989, the bilateral trade in capital goods increased more than one and 
a half times. The trade in goods included in the common list grew fourfold 
during the same period. By 1989, transactions negotiated within the common list 
accounted for around 60 per cent of total bilateral trade.70 Despite growing trade, 
there was no sign of an overall upgrade or structural change in supply. In turn, 
many shortcomings hindered the progress of negotiations. Characterised by 
general defensive behaviour, these negotiations began to face growing 
opposition to the introduction of new products to the common list. Given the 
importance of public spending on capital goods, the lack of harmony in public 
procurement significantly curbed the benefits of the enlarged market. The 
implementation of the CET was marked by delays. Most importantly, 
macroeconomic instability, reflected in the sharp fluctuations of the exchange 
rates, placed crucial impediments on long-term investment and greatly 
aggravated conflicts on both sides.71 
Government intervention was intended to play an important role at the onset 
of PICE.72 Both states were major purchasers of capital goods and crucial 
players in many protocols. For example, with regard to aeronautical protocol, a 
joint venture was set up between two state-owned companies for building and 
commercialising new aircraft. Joint government investments in research and 
development were also set up in such areas as biotechnology and information 
technology. This type of regional integration changed swiftly after 1989. The 
growing strain on government finance further curtailed public investment and 
placed severe limits on the role of the state in the integration process. In turn, 
although bilateral trade was on the rise, the gradual liberalisation approach, 
based on the product-by-product negotiations, proved to be inadequate in 
overcoming protectionist pressures. Furthermore, changes in policy-making in 
both countries strengthened the role of the market, and led to a significant 
reduction in protection on a unilateral basis. Lastly, the growing trend towards 
regionalism in North America and Western Europe put pressure on both 
governments to accelerate the integration process. 
These new circumstances prompted a significant push towards trade 
liberalisation. In 1989, the Bi-national Treaty was signed aimed at the 
establishment of a common market between Brazil and Argentina in 1999. Most 
importantly, there was a shift from product-by-product negotiations to a 
mechanism of general, linear and automatic tariff reductions. This latter change 
was aimed at diluting protectionist pressure and accelerating a downturn in 
bilateral tariffs. The formation of MERCOSUL was completed in 1991, when 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Asuncion Treaty. Given the 
existing close trade and investment links between Paraguay, Uruguay and their 
larger neighbours, their accession to MERCOSUL was seen as a natural 
consequence of the ongoing process. In fact, since the mid-1970s, several 
bilateral agreements had already been established between Argentina, Brazil, 
70 See Campos (1991), p. 28, Table 3. 
71 See Campos (1991). 
72 See Meirelles (1995), Chapter 7. 
Paraguay and Uruguay. The PEC (Programme of Commercial Expansion) 
signed between Brazil and Uruguay in 1976, established preferential treatment 
for a long list of products that was meant to increase over subsequent years. In 
1975, Argentina and Uruguay signed the CAUCE (Argentinean-Uruguayan 
Convention of Economic Cooperation) aimed at trade liberalisation, 
technological upgrading in the agricultural sector and the harmonisation of 
policies within the meat market.73 By 1989, Paraguay had also signed a bilateral 
trade agreement with Argentina. 
The Asuncion Treaty revealed an ambitious objective: the formation of a 
common market among the contracting parties in 1995. In order to foster trade 
liberalisation, a schedule for progressive tariff reduction was agreed. In January 
1991, a preference of 40 per cent was granted across all tariff schedules for 
intra-MERCOSUL trade and a successive increase in preferences was decided.74 
The elimination of non-tariff barriers and other obstacles hindering free trade, 
the coordination of macroeconomic policies, the establishment of sectoral 
agreements, the harmonisation of national legislation where necessary, and the 
adoption of a CET were also among the instruments proposed for achieving the 
common market. A list of products to be excepted from the tariff reduction was 
put forward, but its scope would be narrowed down over a period of time. 
Paraguay and Uruguay were allowed a longer list of exception, and more 
gradual phasing-out schedules than the ones granted to Argentina and Brazil. 
The treaty also specified rules of origin for intra-regional imports during the 
period of transition to a CET, a safeguard clause and procedures for settlement 
of disputes. In addition, the participants were called upon to elaborate a common 
regional policy for dealing with unfair trade practices (dumping and subsidies) 
within non-member countries. A regional competition policy was later envisaged 
for dealing with predatory business practices within MERCOSUL.75 Two major 
institutional bodies were created; the Common Market Council and the Common 
Market Group. The former was to coordinate the integration process and take 
the decisions towards establishing a common market. The latter would be 
responsible for executing and enforcing the decisions taken by the Council. 
The motivations behind MERCOSUL revolved around two issues. Firstly, 
the concern with international competitiveness was a clear feature. MERCOSUL 
was intended to enhance the ability to compete in world markets;76 so that it 
could be seen as part of the new outward-looking development strategy. 
Secondly, the scheme was conceived to respond to growing regionalism 
overseas. The Asuncion Treaty expressed the willingness to coordinate positions 
within the international arena and welcomed applications from other members of 
LAIA. As Jaguaribe (1993) argued, the success of MERCOSUL could be the 
catalyst for regional integration in South America, a role reinforced by the need 
73 See Laens, Lorenzo and Osimani (1993). 
74 A 7% preference would be added in each semester until July 1994. Then, an 11% reduction 
would complete the elimination of the tariff barriers - IBGE (1993). 
75 See Machado (1995b). 
76 See Pena (1992) and Jaguaribe (1993). 
to coordinate the increasingly confusing and complex network of bilateral trade 
agreements, which have erupted throughout the region since the mid-1980s.77 
After four years of negotiations, MERCOSUL reached an 'imperfect' 
customs union. Free intra-regional trade in goods was accomplished, with some 
exceptions included in the so-called 'adjustment lists'. These lists accounted for 
approximately 20 per cent of all product lines and were to be phased out by 
1999 in Brazil and Argentina and by the year 2000 in Uruguay and Paraguay.78 
The CET was agreed for 85 per cent of all products, with countries retaining 
national tariffs for the remaining 15 per cent. The CET ranged between 0 per 
cent and 20 per cent, with an average of 12 per cent. Three different levels of 
protection were distinguished, with lower tariffs for intermediate goods and 
higher ones for capital and consumer goods. Exceptions to the CET were 
divided into two groups. One referred to the national exception lists, which were 
to be phased out by the year 2001 for Brazil and Argentina and 2006 for 
Uruguay and Paraguay.79 The second comprised a number of capital goods, 
telecommunications equipment, and computers and computer-related goods. 
Exceptions for capital goods would be eliminated in 2001 and for the other 
goods in 2006. Many non-trade barriers were eliminated in December 1994 
during the Ouro Preto Conference, and procedures for the harmonisation and 
elimination of ongoing restrictions were devised.80 Compared to past regional 
schemes, the degree of trade liberalisation achieved was considerable. With 
reference to LAFTA, Cline (1982) reported that 'only one-tenth of the total 
possible tariff categories were liberalised over nearly two decades'.81 Moreover, 
the CET entailed considerably lower average tariff levels and dispersion than the 
ones prevailing before the integration process.82 
Important steps were also taken for the coordination of international 
negotiations and the widening of trade preferences. Under the auspices of the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, MERCOSUL countries and the USA 
signed a framework agreement outlining areas of mutual interest for future 
negotiations. In 1996, MERCOSUL and the European Union signed an 
agreement covering many issues, including the promotion of trade relations.83 
There has also been a widening of trade preferences towards other countries in 
the region. In 1996, Bolivia and Chile received the status of associate members 
and signed a free trade area agreement with MERCOSUL.84 Moreover, talks 
have been held aimed at initiating negotiations to establish a free trade area 
encompassing all the countries in South America.85 These movements have 
77 See Rosenthal (1992). 
78 Uruguay asked for 1018 positions to be included in the adjustment list, Argentina for 221, 
Brazil for 29 and Paraguay for 427. See Machado (1995a), p. 19. 
79 The distribution of the list of exceptions was as follows: Brazil asked for exceptions in 233 
tariff positions, Argentina in 232, Uruguay in 212 and Paraguay in 253. Exceptions refer to tariff 
levels above and also below the established CET. See Machado (1995a), p. 19. 
80 Gazeta Mercantil (1995). 
81 See Cline (1982), p. 216. 
82 See Machado (1991). 
83 See IRELA (1997). 
84 See Machado (1996) and Financial Times (several issues). 
85 See Barbosa (1995). 
strengthened MERCOSUL's image as the catalyst for broader regional trade 
liberalisation. 
However, many obstacles to integration still lie ahead, most notably the lack 
of coordination on macroeconomic policy. By setting out rules and agreements 
concerning the management of policy instruments, the governments are seeking 
to make the behaviour of regional macroeconomic variables less volatile, thus 
forging a better environment for investment decisions. The process of 
integration within MERCOSUL has been pursued despite grave macroeconomic 
instability both in Brazil and Argentina. Sharp fluctuations in exchange rates and 
in trade balances have accompanied the rise in trade flows. On many occasions, 
a surge in import demand has prompted calls for protectionism. In Argentina, 
between 1992 and 1993, quotas and anti-dumping procedures were imposed on 
intra-regional imports. More recently, Brazilian authorities also attempted to 
extend trade barriers to intra-regional trade to curb soaring imports.86 Although 
successful efforts at price stabilisation have been introduced in Argentina, and, 
more recently, in Brazil, both economies still face significant adjustment 
problems. Since short-term stabilisation should continue to be given priority on 
the policy agenda, the scope for macroeconomic coordination is limited. Both 
countries require a great deal of discretion over the choice of policy, which 
considerably hampers the pursuit of rules and mechanisms to underscore 
coordination. This conclusion suggests a prospect of volatility that may 
overshadow investment decisions.87 
The CET was a major source of conflict. During negotiations, Brazil pushed 
for a considerably higher degree of protection than envisaged by the other 
members. The discrepancies were particularly marked for capital goods, 
telecommunications equipment, computers and computer-related goods. Such 
activities are considerably larger scale and more sophisticated in Brazil than in 
the other countries. There was, therefore, a strong commitment within the 
country to allow more time for adjustment vis-a-vis foreign competition. In 
contrast, Argentina had slashed tariffs to zero in those sectors expected to favour 
investment and much-needed technological upgrading. The controversy was 
resolved by the proposal of a new group of exceptions to the CET. Nevertheless, 
it was clear during negotiations that the two countries favoured different 
approaches to trade liberalisation. Whereas in Brazil concerns over the impact of 
liberalisation on some manufacturing sectors were vociferous, the Argentine 
position pointed to the benefits for its economy of reduced protection.88 Bearing 
this in mind, future success in fully implementing the CET will prove a true 
commitment to long-lasting integration. 
As noted above, the Treaty of Asunci6n envisaged the elimination of all 
obstacles that directly and indirectly hinder the free circulation of products. This 
comprised the harmonisation of technical norms and standards. However, 
86 See Kume (1996). 
87 For a recent account of the problems confronting macroeconomic coordination within 
MERCOSUL, see Fernandez and Gonzalez (1996). 
88 See Meirelles (1995), Chapter 7 and Machado (1994). 
attempts in this area have encountered serious obstacles. Machado (1996) 
argued that the lack of appropriate legislation and institutions dealing with 
norms and standards, particularly in the smaller countries, has made the task 
much more difficult. Financial and technical resources are needed not only for 
harmonising aspects that may obstruct trade, but also for creating desirable, 
internationally recognised norms and standards where they are lacking. The 
implementation of a regional competition policy appears to be hampered by 
similar problems. Regulatory frameworks for curbing predatory behaviour are 
either non-existent or inadequate, meaning that much of the work has to start 
from scratch. Measures for facilitating customs procedures have also been 
delayed. Consequently, problems relating to discrepancies in national 
legislation, excessive bureaucracy and inadequate technical resources began to 
hinder intra-regional trade. Moreover, the lack of investment in infrastructure 
has resulted in a transport system that has been unable to cope efficiently with 
fast-growing trade. 
There has been criticism of the institutional framework that encompasses the 
whole integration effort. It is argued that the inter-governmental bodies 
established by the Treaty of Asuncion do not provide grounds for an effective 
mechanism of dispute settlement, nor are they strong enough to cope with the 
challenge of 'deeper' integration. Many of the disputes among member countries 
have so far been resolved by direct negotiations between governments. Indeed, 
the absence of complex and expensive regional institutions has, until now, been 
a much-appreciated feature of the integration process. However, critics claim 
that such methods for dealing with controversy rely excessively on the prevailing 
political environment and the willingness of government officials to negotiate.89 
Moreover, in view of the many problems incurred in attaining free intra-regional 
trade, there are doubts as to whether the existing institutional bodies will cope 
with the task in hand. In essence, the need for some sort of supra-national 
council, with more autonomy from the prevailing political establishment, has 
been often emphasised.90 This permanent supra-national sphere should make the 
mechanisms for dispute settlement more transparent and facilitate the 
accomplishment of the successive stages of integration. Last, but not least, the 
establishment of a permanent MERCOSUL institution, capable of dealing with 
the issues highlighted above, will require extra financial and technical resources. 
Analysis of Trade Flows in MERCOSUL 
MERCOSUL was conceived as instrumental in buttressing efficiency and as a 
step towards an outward-looking development strategy. However, there is no a 
priori assumption that an imperfect customs union will ensure a move towards a 
better allocation of resources. Thus, it is paramount to gauge the impact of 
MERCOSUL on trade flows and welfare. Table 2 presents total trade flows and 
GDP per capita in each member country, over the last decade. After a decade of 
absolute decline in GDP per capita, the early 1990s brought a resumption of 
89 See Machado (1995b) and Machado (1996). 
90 See Araujo (1997). 
growth in all countries. As GDP has grown, international trade has boomed. 
Nevertheless, the behaviour of exports and imports has been markedly different; 
in all countries, the recent growth of imports outpaced the expansion of exports. 
The differences in export and import growth rates have turned a considerable 
trade surplus at the start of the 1990s into a rising trade deficit by the middle of 
the decade. Many factors account for this performance: firstly, tariff and non-
tariff barriers have been unilaterally slashed in all countries; secondly, although 
GDP growth has fluctuated significantly, Table 2 shows a recent upward trend in 
most countries; and thirdly, there have also been signs of exchange rates being 
increasingly overvalued.91 
Table 2 - External Trade and GDP per-capita in MERCOSUL 
Average Annual Growth Rates 
GDP per capita (%) 
1980-90 1990-95 
Argentina -2.2 3.9 
Brazil -0.6 1.1 
Paraguay -0.2 0.3 
Uruguay -0.3 3.0 
Average Annual Growth Rates 
Exports (%) 
1980-90 1990-1995 
Argentina 5.0 7.1 
Brazil 7.1 6.3 
Paraguay 8.1 12.5 
Uruguay 4.7 6.7 
Average Annual Growth Rates 
Imports (%) 
1980-90 1990-1995 
Argentina -8.2 27.1 
Brazil -0.2 17.0 
Paraguay 7.7 15.0 
Uruguay -1.0 14.7 
Source: IDB (1996). 
Although there is evidence suggesting considerable appreciation of real exchange rates in 
countries such as Argentina, the extent to which these shifts in real exchange rates are not 
consistent with balance of payments equilibrium in the long run is open to debate, see Edwards 
(1993). 
Table 3 - MERCOSUL and ROW Imports and Exports 
(US$ millions at current prices) 
Argentina 
Average 1986-89 (1) Average 1990-96 (2) (2)/(l) 
Exports to MERCOSUL 991.7 4014.0 4.05 
Exports to ROW 6985.5 11910.2 1.70 
Total 7977.2 15924.2 
Imports from MERCOSUL 968.5 3565.2 3.68 
Imports from ROW 4043.2 12011.5 2.97 
Total 5011.7 15576.7 
Brazil 
Averagel986-89 (1) Averagel990-96 (2) 
(2)/(1) 
Exports to MERCOSUL 1392.0 4641.8 3.33 
Exports to ROW 27376.2 34669.5 1.27 
Total 28768.2 39311.4 
Imports from MERCOSUL 1398.0 4266.8 3.05 
Imports from ROW 15656.2 27661.4 1.77 
Total 17054.2 31928.2 
Paraguay 
Average 1986-89 (1) Average 1990-96 (2) (2)/(l) 
Exports to MERCOSUL 200.9 397.9 1.98 
Exports to ROW 340.5 438.8 1.29 
Total 541.4 836.7 
Imports from MERCOSUL (*) 230.8 645.2 2.79 
Imports from ROW (*) 320.3 1039.0 3.24 
Total 551.2 1684.3 
Uruguay 
Average 1986-89 (1)_ Average 1990-96 (2) (2)/(l) 
Exports to MERCOSUL 394.2 790.7 2.01 
Exports to ROW 922.8 1075.2 1.17 
Total 1317.0 1866.0 
Imports from MERCOSUL 453.7 1053.2 2.32 
Imports from ROW 642.7 1279.0 1.99 
Total 1096.4 2332.2 
Source: Elaborated by the author with data from SALA (1996) and (*) Brazilian Central Bank: 
MERCOSUL Bulletin (various years). 
Table 3 presents the performance of trade flows to and from MERCOSUL 
and the rest of the world (ROW) to each member country. Clearly, compared to 
the period 1986-89, the start of the 1990s saw an expansion in trade flows within 
regional and ROW markets. However, in all countries except Paraguay there has 
been a relative reorientation of imports and exports towards MERCOSUL. The 
shift has been greater for exports in Argentina and Brazil. Brazilian exports to 
MERCOSUL increased more than three times in the period, whereas exports to 
ROW rose by 27 per cent. Imports from MERCOSUL grew more than three 
times, while imports from ROW grew 77 per cent. In Argentina, regional exports 
rose more than fourfold in the period considered, while exports to ROW rose by 
only 70 per cent. Imports from MERCOSUL increased almost fourfold, while 
purchases from ROW grew almost threefold.92 
Table 4 presents GDP shares of exports and imports during the 1989-90 and 
1994-95 periods. Looking at exports, one can note that in all countries the share 
of extra-regional exports over GDP decreased in the period considered. The 
GDP share of intra-regional exports increased in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 
but decreased in Paraguay. With regard to imports, one can see a rise in the ratio 
of intra-regional imports to GDP in all countries. Figures for extra-regional 
import shares also rose in all countries. In Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, the 
rise in intra-regional shares was, however, considerably higher than the increase 
in extra-regional shares. Again, this evidence suggests a relative reorientation of 
trade towards MERCOSUL. 
Table 4 - Trade-GDP Shares: 1988/89 and 1994/95 (%) 
Exports/GDP 
1988/89 1994/95 
MERCOSUL ROW MERCOSUL ROW 
Argentina 1.39 9.87 2.05 4.48 
Brazil 0.42 8.79 0.94 6.09 
Paraguay 6.73 12.58 5.66 4.66 
Uruguay 5.53 13.63 5.57 6.27 
Imports/GDP 
1988/89 1994/95 
MERCOSUL ROW MERCOSUL ROW 
Argentina 1.23 4.50 1.65 5.74 
Brazil 0.48 4.52 0.89 5.57 
Paraguay 5.78 8.69 12.25 17.00 
Uruguay 6.54 8.67 7.92 8.72 
Source: Brazilian Central Bank: MERCOSUL Bulletin (various years). 
92 Recent trade figures for Argentina and Brazil have shown similar features. Between 1996 and 
1997, Brazilian exports to MERCOSUL rose 23.8%, while exports to ROW increased barely 9%. 
For imports, purchases from MERCOSUL rose 16.42%, whereas purchases from ROW increased 
by 14.86%. In the case of Argentina, between 1996 and 1997, exports to MERCOSUL countries 
rose 13.98%, in clear contrast to the flow towards the ROW, which increased only 1.92%. Imports 
from MERCOSUL rose by 30.97%, whereas purchases from ROW increased 26.53%. See SECEX 
(1998) and INDEC (1998). 
The evolution of trade shares over time does not provide information on the 
magnitude of trade creation and trade diversion. In addition to regional trade 
preferences, those shares are influenced by unilateral changes in protection 
within MERCOSUL and the ROW, the modification of consumer preferences, 
changes in comparative advantage and differences in GDP growth rates between 
regional and ROW markets. Therefore, to shed light on the net benefits of 
integration, one needs a much more careful examination of trade flows. 
Yeats (1996) took a step in this direction by using export data to build 
several indices to evaluate the relative importance of trade diversion and trade 
creation. Firstly, the study showed the rise in intra-MERCOSUL shares over 
total exports for the period 1979-81 and for 1994. It also revealed that 
manufactured goods accounted for an increasing proportion of intra-
MERCOSUL exports. To give an idea of the relative importance of regional and 
world markets for each country's exports, a trade-intensity ratio was constructed. 
This gives the ratio of two relative variables: the first is the share of intra-
regional exports of country I to J over total I exports and the second is the share 
of country J total imports over the world total imports net of country I imports. 
For MERCOSUL, the figures showed a considerable rise, particularly after the 
late 1980s, meaning that there has been a reorientation of trade towards regional 
markets, even when one takes into account the changes in the size of regional 
markets. To examine the net welfare effect of the shift in trade flows, three 
additional indices were compared. First, a regional orientation index was built 
for commodity J indicating the relative importance of intra-regional over ROW 
markets for its exports. In addition, an index of revealed comparative advantage 
was constructed, which examines the MERCOSUL's propensity to export 
commodity J in relation to the rest of the world. Finally, an index of factor 
intensity was used, delineating the relative labour-intensity of commodity J 
production. By comparing orientation and revealed comparative advantage 
indices, it is clear that the commodities showing the greatest reorientation 
(largest positive change of orientation index) towards MERCOSUL markets 
were the ones with a strong comparative disadvantage. Moreover, commodities 
with a fast growing orientation index were also found to have wide margins of 
preference for intra-regional sales. In sum, MERCOSUL's preferences had 
created perverse specialisation; they spurred trade in commodities in which 
countries had comparative disadvantage. This evidence led the author to suggest 
that MERCOSUL was predominantly diverting trade and thus harmful to the 
region and to the world as a whole. 
Although Yeats's analysis was considerably more complex than the simple 
observation of trade shares, it still relied on indices that may or may not capture 
the intended effects. Indeed, if import data is used instead of export data, much 
of the above would no longer be valid. Devlin (1996) analysed import values for 
1990 and 1995 and found the reorientation effect to be much weaker than in the 
case of exports. Furthermore, there was no strong correlation between the level 
of MERCOSUL preferences and the change of trade orientation. 
Cristaldo (1994) also attempted to evaluate the magnitude of trade diversion 
and trade creation within MERCOSUL. The study referred to data for 1989 and 
could thus be seen as an ex-ante attempt to measure the impact of MERCOSUL. 
The author relied on a partial equilibrium model, whereby the magnitude of 
trade creation and diversion depends on: the price-elasticity of import demand; 
the elasticity of substitution between regional and ROW imports; the differences 
in regional and ROW export prices; the share of ROW imports in total imports; 
and changes in the tariff levels. The main assumptions of the model included an 
infinite elasticity of export supply, similar price and substitution elasticity for 
every country in the region and fixed world prices. Before integration, it was 
assumed that intra-MERCOSUL and ROW imports would be subject to similar 
tariffs. The establishment of MERCOSUL would imply free trade among 
members and a CET. Table 5 presents the main results of Cristaldo's analysis. 
The figures refer to a CET that is equal to the average tariff prior to integration. 
They also refer to two levels of elasticity of substitution between MERCOSUL 
and ROW imports and two ratios of ROW and MERCOSUL export prices. The 
first two columns account for the net welfare benefit from integration as a 
proportion of GNP, given that export prices are similar in MERCOSUL and 
ROW (p* =1). The last two columns indicate the results for the situation in 
which ROW prices are half those in MERCOSUL (p* =0.5).93 
Table 5 - Ex-ante MERCOSUL Net Benefit (% of GNP) 
P*=l P*=0.5 
High low high low 
Argentina 0.004 0.003 -0.3 0.0 
Brazil 0.01 0.01 -0.1 0.2 
Paraguay -0.12 -0.16 -3.2 1.7 
Uruguay 0.09 0.09 -2.8 0.2 
Source: Cristaldo (1994), p. 106, Table 6.2, and p. 109, Table 6.3. 
high scenario - elasticity of substitution equals 2.5 
low scenario - elasticity of substitution equals 1.5 
According to Table 5, Brazil was the country most likely to gain from 
integration. Only when elasticity reaches high levels and relative prices are 0.5, 
would Brazil lose out. At the other extreme, Paraguay would seem to lose in 
almost all scenarios but one: when relative prices and elasticity were low. In 
fact, in the first two columns Paraguay demonstrated negative trade creation; 
goods imported before integration were now supplied by domestic firms. The 
figures for Uruguay followed a similar pattern to those for Brazil. However, 
Uruguay would lose out considerably in case of high elasticity and low relative 
ROW-MERCOSUL prices. Argentina would gain when relative prices are equal 
and lose otherwise. The relatively favourable picture for Brazil and gloomy 
scenario for Paraguay is a function of the impact of a CET. In Brazil, the CET 
was substantially lower than the tariffs prior to integration; thus, MERCOSUL 
93 When price differences between MERCOSUL and ROW are absent, the possibility of trade 
diversion disappears and net welfare benefit improves. 
meant an overall opening up to international markets. In the case of Paraguay, 
the opposite occurred: the implementation of the CET raised the level of 
protection with a negative effect on welfare. 
Some important shortcomings could be highlighted in Cristaldo's 
methodology. Firstly, it would be useful to consider a more realistic approach to 
the export sector, namely a less than infinite elasticity of export supply. 
Secondly, by ruling out general equilibrium effects, one significantly restricts the 
impact of trade liberalisation and its effect on distinct sectors. Integration will 
lead to changes in factor prices, real exchange rates, income and inter-sectoral 
relations. These changes cannot be foreseen within a partial equilibrium 
framework. Thirdly, relative ROW-MERCOSUL prices do vary between 
different sectors and the two scenarios describe only two hypothetical outcomes. 
However, the study yielded some important results. The benefits of 
MERCOSUL may be spread fairly unevenly over the four members. And, to 
ensure welfare gains and restrict the scope for losses that might considerably 
affect the smaller countries, MERCOSUL should aim at a low CET. 
Conclusions 
From the mid-1980s onwards, the world economy has witnessed a revival of 
regionalism. Compared to the surge of RTAs back in the 1960s, this new trend 
has quite distinct characteristics. Not only has there been a clear reduction in 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, but also a great deal of effort towards reducing 
'non-border' obstacles to trade and harmonising policies and standards. The 
measures taken to facilitate the flow of direct foreign investment are of 
particular importance. The main motivations behind the new regionalism 
stemmed from the problems regarding multilateral negotiations. Notwithstanding 
the successful end of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, there are still 
uncertainties over the implementation of the agreed procedures and the 
prospects for future agreement on key issues such as intellectual property, 
services and foreign direct investment. 
One remarkable feature of new regionalism has been the United States's 
adherence to its tenets. Previously a strong supporter of multilateralism, the 
United States has sponsored NAFTA and has now turned its sights to other parts 
of Latin America for further trade arrangements. Here, like Baldwin's domino 
effect, the continual widening of the EU has certainly influenced the United 
States's change in attitudes. Difficult questions arise when one considers the 
effects of regionalism on the achievement of free trade worldwide. Both sides of 
the debate have convincing arguments and weaknesses; there are no easy 
answers. In practical terms, there are calls to ensure, possibly through a WTO 
ruling, that new and existing regional schemes are conducive to further trade 
liberalisation and limited in their capacity to harm outside competitors. 
The establishment of new RTAs between developing and developed 
countries, as in the case of Mexico and NAFTA, or the widening of existing 
schemes to encompass relatively poor countries, as in the EU, have been other 
key features of the new process of integration. Guaranteed access to a large 
market, the opportunity to 'lock in' reforms to trade and investment regimes and 
the possibility to 'borrow' institutions conducive to growth and stabilisation are 
major incentives for developing countries. There are, however, important 
shortcomings. Developing countries may end up adopting the protectionist 
habits of rich partners, to their own detriment and that of the world as a whole. 
Moreover, when it comes to the harmonisation of policies and standards, the 
bargaining process may lead to unfavourable procedures or legislation for 
countries with a lower level of development. 
Latin America has been the scenario for many renewed attempts at 
integration, which are now being perceived as an element of a new development 
strategy. The new model for development again relies upon international trade as 
the 'engine of growth', and boasts an impressive process of unilateral trade 
liberalisation. Thus, regionalism has taken on the instrumental role of buttressing 
international trade. Another characteristic of the new regionalism in Latin 
America relates to the bargaining of a prospective trade agreement with the 
United States. RTAs would avoid the so-called 'hub and spoke' pattern of trade 
and investment. Here, distorted incentives would be likely to encourage 
investment in the economy with the largest market and with free access to all the 
countries. In addition, the formation of a regional scheme appeals to many, as 
being the best approach for counterbalancing the asymmetry in bargaining 
power when negotiating an RTA with the United States. 
Bearing in mind these changes in course in Latin America, this paper has 
examined the achievements and pitfalls of MERCOSUL. At the start of the 
1980s, Argentina and Brazil began a process of diplomatic and commercial 
approximation that culminated in the 1986 PICE. Integration evolved around 
several protocols concerning sectoral agreements and proposals for gradual 
product-by-product trade liberalisation. The most important part of the 
programme was the liberalisation of trade in capital goods. Following a period 
of successful trade expansion, negotiations stagnated as they were blocked by 
protectionist pressures. Moreover, growing strains on government finance 
limited achievements in other areas where the state had a prominent role. 
Increasing macroeconomic volatility also considerably curbed the impetus for 
investment and changes on the supply side. Changes in domestic and external 
circumstances hastened the integration process. Across-the-board tariff 
reductions were introduced, and both countries began to envisage the formation 
of a common market. Having already established close trade and investment 
links with Argentina and Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay were incorporated in the 
scheme. In 1991, the Treaty of Asuncion created MERCOSUL and anticipated 
the establishment of a common market by 1995. The agreement covered the 
dismantling of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the elimination of all measures 
that hinder the circulation of goods and services. The harmonisation of norms, 
standards and policies was also put high on the agenda. 
After the four years of transition, MERCOSUL reached an imperfect 
customs union. Around 80 per cent of all commodities were given duty-free 
treatment within MERCOSUL. A CET was agreed upon for 85 per cent of tariff 
lines. The scope for liberalisation has been substantial when compared with the 
poor results of previous attempts in the region. More importantly, the 
implementation of the CET has reduced both the average tariff and the variance 
between tariffs when compared to levels prior to integration. The efforts to 
harmonise norms and standards, and to eliminate and simplify customs 
procedures, have come up against serious obstacles. Delays in these areas have 
hindered the rising flow of trade. Given the short-term problems associated with 
macroeconomic imbalances, the scope for coordinating exchange rates, 
monetary and fiscal policies seems limited. Thus, the already recurrent conflicts 
between the objectives of trade liberalisation and the need to accomplish short-
term equilibrium in the macroeconomic sphere are likely to persist. 
By looking at data on recent trade flows and examining some studies on the 
theme, an attempt has been made to analyse the potential net welfare benefits of 
MERCOSUL. Apart from the usual caveats linked to each method of 
measurement, the task of evaluating the benefits in MERCOSUL has been 
further complicated by a number of other factors. In most studies, it is not 
possible to separate the impact of MERCOSUL preferences from the effects of 
rising growth rates, unilateral cuts in tariffs and possibly overvalued exchange 
rates. These elements are, however, crucial in explaining the rise in total trade 
and, most important, the rapid expansion of imports between the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. By looking at the trade figures for intra-MERCOSUL trade and 
trade with the ROW, one can note a relative reorientation of trade towards 
MERCOSUL. The changes have been greater in the larger countries and on the 
export side. A similar picture emerged when the shares of intra-MERCOSUL 
and ROW imports and exports over GDP were evaluated. These measures were, 
nevertheless, affected by many elements apart from regional preferences, and 
they did not serve the purpose of measuring trade diversion and trade creation. 
Attempts have been made in this direction. Yeats (1996) devised a series of 
indices based on export data, concluding that MERCOSUL was to a large extent 
responsible for widespread trade diversion. However, looking at similar indices 
based on imports, Devlin (1996) did not find evidence of significant trade 
diversion. Adopting a partial equilibrium model, Cristaldo (1994) provided ex-
ante estimations of the effects of MERCOSUL on welfare. The conclusions 
were sensitive to the values of key parameters and to distinct scenarios referring 
to relative export prices. Within her hypothetical scenario, changes in protection 
against ROW, resulting from the implementation of the CET, mainly determined 
gains from integration. Cristaldo identified one big winner, Brazil, which would 
experience an overall reduction in tariffs. She also identified a potential big 
loser, Paraguay, where integration would raise barriers to trade. 
These mixed results suggest that further research is needed to enable any real 
conclusions on the issue. However, some factors can be highlighted that would 
enhance trade creation and curb diversion. The deadlines for interim exceptions 
should be fulfilled, and members should seek the widening of preferences for 
other countries. The use of anti-dumping procedures and countervailing 
measures towards extra-regional imports needs to be restricted. Finally, 
MERCOSUL should implement measures to simplify customs procedures and 
harmonise norms and standards, which clearly hinder the circulation of products 
within the region. In addition, there is a case for close monitoring of trade flows 
and tackling emerging distortions. Lastly, there are important concerns about the 
institutional structure of MERCOSUL. To secure what has already been 
achieved and facilitate future stages of integration, it is argued that some degree 
of discretion over domestic policies should be sacrificed to accomplish the goals 
of integration. Thus, the gradual building of supra-national entities and 
legislation should be considered. These institutional changes should strengthen 
the dispute settlement mechanism, making it more transparent and open to 
complaints, reduce the reliance on prevailing political circumstances and step up 
the harmonisation of standards and other policies. 
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